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Abstract
Traffic volumes between China, Europe and Central Asia through China’s ‘CR Express’ intercontinental rail freight sys-
tem remain intransparent. We sought new methods of data collection to better understand the significance of this novel 
trans-Eurasian transport mode. Cumulative causation economic theory can explain how positive industrial develop-
ment can occur in both linear transport corridors and industrial cluster development in node cities. However on current 
economic metrics, it is difficult to accept the China narrative of structurally transformative economic development 
resulting from the intercontinental rail system policy. This paper expresses doubt as to the underlying institutional fac-
tors behind the intercontinental rail system being developed by China and its surrounding Eurasian transport policy. 
We detail the economic theory underpinning the development of the ‘CR Express’ policy through examination of China 
central level transport policy sources and their horizontal integration with other central-level spatial planning poli-
cies, and we examine the deployment of China’s model of intercontinental rail development in the ‘Middle Corridor’ be-
tween the Kazakhstan border and Eastern European ports. Both theory and practice point to supply-side development 
of greater containerised transport capacity resulting in complementarity-driven economic growth clusters. However, 
without adequate demand, industrial investment in Eurasian clusters, or transparent statistics with which to gauge 
either the rail freight logistics development or the economic development spill-over effects, we expect to find the initial 
practical economic results in the Eurasian economies underwhelming. We argue that China’s Eurasian transport poli-
cies are not multifaceted enough to result in future growth.
Zusammenfassung
Das Verkehrsaufkommen zwischen China, Europa und Zentralasien über Chinas interkontinentales Schienengü-
terverkehrssystem „CR Express“ bleibt undurchsichtig. Wir haben neue Methoden der Datensammlung erörtert, 
um die tatsächliche Bedeutung dieses neuen transeurasischen Verkehrsmittels zu ergründen. Die ökonomische 
Theorie der kumulativen Verursachung kann erklären, wie eine positive industrielle Entwicklung sowohl in 
linearen Verkehrskorridoren als auch bei der Entwicklung industrieller Cluster in Städten, die Verkehrskno-
tenpunkte darstellen, stattfinden kann. Angesichts der aktuellen Wirtschaftsindikatoren ist es jedoch schwie-
rig, Chinas Narrativ von einer strukturell transformativen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung zu akzeptieren, die 
sich aus der Politik des interkontinentalen Schienengüterverkehrssystem ergebe. Dieser Beitrag äußert Zweifel 
an den institutionellen Faktoren, die mit dem von China entwickelten, interkontinentalen Schienengüterver-
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1. Introduction 
The China Rail Express (CR Express) system is the lo-
gistics management institution through which inter-
continental rail freight between China and Europe 
as well as China and Central Asia is organised. It is a 
central policy-planned model which is part prescrip-
tive command economy, part co-option of existing and 
continuing subnational rail freight lines and policies, 
part subsidy organisation mechanism, and part na-
tional champion State-owned Enterprise. The devel-
opment of the Belt and Road rail corridors under CR 
Express is institutionally independent and potentially 
transformative in a Kaldorian cumulative causation 
economic analysis. We explore the use of Kaldorian 
cumulative causation in developing Eurasian trans-
port infrastructure and transport economic potential 
arguing that CR Express is fundamentally supply-side 
driven by China’s Eurasian rail development policy, 
yet dependent on European demand-side drivers. Giv-
en that the detail of the freight volumes between Chi-
na, Europe, and Central Asia remain intransparent, it 
is difficult to either accept the hype of the interconti-
nental rail system or to wholly dismiss the system as 
a China central government attempt at geoeconomics.
There has been little critical engagement with the 
use of transport infrastructure in Eurasia along the 
Iron Silk Road. Much Belt and Road analysis discusses 
infrastructure investment, ignoring that most infra-
structure investment and development in Central 
Asia was done by the countries themselves or that the 
European Union (EU) had a more important role than 
China (Bucsky and Kenderdine 2021). Most important-
ly, almost all Belt and Road research has ignored that 
China’s investment in the Eurasian region has been 
driven by industrial capacity transfers, not by new 
infrastructure investment (Kenderdine and Ling 2018; 
Kenderdine and Lan 2019; Kenderdine 2018a). Where 
China has institutionally developed the use of exist-
ing infrastructure under CR Express, data is difficult 
to obtain and few studies have tried (Bucsky 2019; 
Bucsky and Kenderdine 2020a). There needs to be a 
greater research emphasis on transnational capital in 
Central Asia from geoeconomic, geoindustrial, politi-
cal geography and economic geography perspectives, 
although there is an emerging scholarship on CR Ex-
press and China’s Belt and Road rail policies (Peper-
mans 2019; Tambellini 2018; Pomfret 2019). However 
there remain few theoretical papers on the CR Express 
system from political economy, political anthropol-
ogy or political geography perspectives. Many serious 
studies still Orientalise the Central Asian field with 
lived-experience autoethnographies being published 
as if they were genuine research (Grant 2020; Joniak-
Lüthi 2020).
Missing from most analyses of all aspects of China’s 
Belt and Road are qualitative datapoints sourced from 
the China public administration. China’s transition 
economy retains many elements of the communist 
planned economy. This means that the central gov-
ernment coordinates huge regional agglomeration 
industrial complementarities into a national system 
of industrial development. This is highly coordinated 
horizontally across ministries, sub-ministerial agen-
cies and other Party-State organs, as well as verti-
cally down the provincial, prefectural and county 
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kehrssystem und seiner generellen eurasischen geoökonomischen Politik einhergehen. Wir erläutern die Wirt-
schaftstheorie, die die Basis für die Entwicklung der „CR Express“-Richtliniendokumenten bildete, indem wir 
die Quellen der Verkehrspolitik auf zentraler Ebene der öffentlichen Verwaltung Chinas und deren horizontale 
Integration mit anderen Raumplanungsprogrammen auf der zentralen Ebene untersuchen. Wir untersuchen 
ebenfalls die Umsetzung des China-Modells der interkontinentalen Schienengüterverkehrsentwicklung im 
„Mittlere Korridor“ zwischen der Kasachstan Grenze und der osteuropäischen Häfen. Sowohl Theorie als auch 
Praxis deuten auf die Möglichkeit einer angebotsseitigen Entwicklung größerer Schienengüterverkehrskapa-
zitäten hin, die zu Komplementarität getriebenen Wirtschaftswachstumsclustern führen könnte. Ohne ausrei-
chende Nachfrage, industrielle Investitionen in eurasische Cluster oder transparente Statistiken, anhand derer 
entweder die Entwicklung der Schienengüterverkehrslogistik oder die Auswirkungen der wirtschaftlichen Ent-
wicklung beurteilt werden können, erwarten wir jedoch, dass die praktischen wirtschaftlichen Ergebnisse in 
den eurasischen Volkswirtschaften nicht überzeugend transformativ sein werden. Wir behaupten, dass Chinas 
eurasische Verkehrspolitik nicht vielfältig genug ist, um zukünftiges Wachstum zu erzielen.
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level public administration structure. This makes 
analysis of China’s geoeconomic policy in external 
geographies highly visible through analysis of public 
policy documents. Where this public administration 
of geoeconomic policy fails though is in policy com-
munication horizontally with external host econo-
mies. For example, in Central Asia, where a China 
provincial geoeconomic policy mechanism between 
provincial and prefectural levels of government might 
be well-orchestrated and integrated into larger spa-
tial plans, horizontal coordination with national or 
subnational governments in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan 
or Kyrgyzstan are underdeveloped and lack function-
ality. China’s export of this domestic industrial policy 
system to its external geographies through a geoin-
dustrial policy public administration architecture 
has thus failed to develop into a cogent international 
economic institutional system. This political failure to 
develop institutional infrastructure is a bigger failure 
than the shaky economic foundations of the intercon-
tinental containerised rail freight system on the Belt 
and Road.
The paper is organised into an examination of the 
theoretical basis for regional industrial development 
strategies using a stylised model of Kaldorian cumu-
lative causation. We then establish a China public ad-
ministration policy discourse path-dependency anal-
ysis of the ongoing development of the CR Express rail 
freight system and wider Eurasian transport policy 
integration under China’s national and subnational 
industrial and transport policy. The following sec-
tion comprises statistical analysis of traffic by mode 
of transport along the Middle Corridor, known inter-
changeably as the Trans Caspian International Trade 
Route (TITR), which is the most institutionally de-
veloped international rail freight corridor within the 
Belt and Road macropolicy due to the large number of 
states involved. The final section adds some textual 
analysis of academic literature related to the Eurasian 
rail project and related policies, arguing that incoher-
ent policy narrative transmission from China to local 
Eurasian economies adds to the intercontinental rail 
plan’s political obfuscation and the intransparency of 
other Belt and Road projects. We conclude with scep-
ticism about any actual cumulative causation effects 
under current political and economic institutional 
structures, however accept that under better institu-
tional settings that economic integration and cumula-
tive causation industrial development could occur in 
regional economies along the Belt and Road corridors.
2. Policy management of Kaldorian expecta-
tions
Theoretical economic contributions to understanding 
state and regional industrial restructuring have come 
from many sources since the beginning of nation-
state industrialisation (List 1856; Gerschenkron 1962). 
Friedrich List’s national system of political economy is 
generally regarded as the key contributor to remodel-
ling the European industrialisation experience in new 
geographies ( Johnson 1982; Chang 2002). Thorsten Ve-
blen (1915) also began to identify institutions within 
national and imperial systems of industrial economic 
development as the key unit of analysis. There is some 
continuity between List and Veblen in attempting to 
untangle the institutions of economic development 
of European states, especially considering the role of 
railways. But it was Gunnar Myrdal (1954, 1957) and 
Nicholas Kaldor (1970; 1975) who began to conceptual-
ise economic growth, economic decline and economic 
history in terms of the institutions of cumulative and 
cyclical causation. Contemporary development eco-
nomic practice has largely forgotten this theoretical 
contribution to institutional and geographic growth 
models and regional economic development, aside 
from a few contemporaries (Fujita 2007, Toner 1999). 
Kaldorian and Myrdalian circular and cumulative 
causation theories segue broadly with post-Keynes-
ian economic growth theories and institutional eco-
nomic analyses of structural economics (Palley 2002). 
There remain conflicting typologies within economic 
theory on growth, growth models, endogeneity, exo-
geneity and the impacts of supply, demand, external 
technology inputs and external capital inputs. Argy-
rous (1996) considers endogenous growth models 
within industrial economies, arguing the universality 
of path-dependent industrialisation as economic de-
velopment. Cumulative causation theory explains the 
path-dependent industrial growth models of Japan 
and the northeast Asian industrialised economies, 
and Skott and Auerbach (1995) attribute the applica-
tion of non-equilibrium growth models with positive 
government intervention in the economic develop-
ment of industrial states. 21st Century economic de-
velopment theory must also consider leap-frog strat-
egies of technological development being integrated 
into the known-path industrial development experi-
ence, but this can also be theorised into post-Keynesi-
an endogenous models of growth without recourse to 
exogenous actors (Araujo 2013). Myrdalian cumula-
tive causation considers the structural economic ex-
China’s Belt and Road rail freight transport corridors – the economic geography of underdevelopment
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perience of industrialisation in terms of uneven geo-
graphic development (Myrdal 1954, 1957), however 
the Kaldorian model is more easily intersected with 
classical positivist economics. The Kaldorian contri-
bution on uneven development based on economic ge-
ography explains in positivist terms multivariate cau-
sation of different economic agents’ outcomes within 
nations, within bordered economies such as the EU, 
and uneven development within cross-border geoeco-
nomic zones like China’s Belt and Road. 
Applying cumulative causation to China’s CR Express 
and Middle Corridor rail freight system means con-
sidering a multivariate causality model of economic 
development and endogenous growth. For a practi-
cal demonstration of how CR Express and Middle Cor-
ridor could result in localised endogenous growth in 
Central Asian economies, we employ a modified form 
of O’Hara’s (2008) model of combined Myrdalian and 
Kaldorian cumulative causation. O’Hara’s model com-
bines three aspects of Myrdal (1954, 1957) and Kaldor 
(1970, 1975): circular causation or interrelated varia-
bles; cumulative causation, or variables with positive 
or negative feedback loops; and institutional path-
dependence, a way of bringing in both time and space 
to the analysis of historical change. O’Hara’s model 
also considers the possibilities of both accumulation 
and decumulation. The phenomenon which we are 
primarily concerned with in our stylised model of the 
Middle Corridor case study is of a period of initial accu-
mulation from an exogenous policy intervention but 
which then becomes a cumulative cause of decumula-
tion once the exogenous stimulus is removed and no 
endogenous growth takes place.
In O’Hara’s stylised four-segment cumulative causa-
tion cultural and socioeconomic axes are effectively 
Finance Capital, Social Capital, Asocial Capital, and 
Human Capital, represented as Y, N, A, H, and where 
four segments of human activity occur at YH, YN, NA, 
HA (cf. Fig. 1). The change represented in Y/N1-Y/N0 
in panels 1 and 2 would be a positive change which 
stimulates economic growth (endogenous accumula-
tion), for example a new factory or a new transport 
line being built. The change represented Y/N1-Y/N0 is 
an initial positive change (endogenous accumulation) 
followed by a negative change (endogenous decumu-
lation), for example a new factory being built but then 
closing down or a government subsidy being intro-
duced but then removed. We incorporate political sci-
ence theory to define and label the points of change as 
‘critical junctures’ in the tradition of historical insti-
tutionalism (Skocpol and Pierson 2002; Steinmo 2008; 
Thelen 2002); for example, a policy intervention from 
Beijing in a Central Asian state is a critical juncture. 
However, through both the stylised model and the 
wider study, we still consider the institution as the 
basic unit of analysis in the economic sense of North 
(1989).
To expand the model to demonstrate simultaneous 
multi-variate causality in panel 4, we simply imag-
ine simultaneous critical junctures occurring within 
O’Hara’s four-segment cultural and socioeconomic 
model, creating their own cumulative causative func-
tions, both idiosyncratic and interacting with and af-
fecting processes in the other four segments. In the 
fifth model, we substitute stylised variables for our 
real-world case study of the CR Express policy and its 
institutional impact on the development of the Mid-
dle Corridor, the Trans-Caspian International Trade 
Route.
Cumulative causation theory yields a holistic yet 
fuzzy definition of how structural changes in multi-
variate economic systems work. Myrdal (1954, 1957) 
and Kaldor (1970,1975) were concerned with explain-
ing the processes of the multivariate causes of growth 
and contraction which equilibrium economics does a 
poor job of explaining in terms of agglomeration ver-
sus dispersion; accumulation versus decumulation, 
and virtuous cycles versus vicious cycles. Cumulative 
causation’s multivariate causality epistemology is a 
major economic theory for exploring processes of eco-
nomic development outside the orthodox Keynesian 
framework, helping to explain endogenous growth, 
capital agglomeration, uneven regional economic 
development, and the combinatory role of industrial 
complementarity clusters as poles of regional eco-
nomic development. It explains the geographic insti-
tutionalism of regional variations both within and 
across bordered economies, and shows how decumu-
lation can occur not only as a result of supply-demand 
mismatch but by such things as technology supersed-
ence, industrial overcapacity, or superfluous infra-
structure builds. Cumulative causation gives primacy 
to the structural and institutional nature of the eco-
nomic system within which the agents of endogenous 
or exogenous growth act. 
Cumulative causation can explain how new markets, 
institutions, trade routes, and industrial infrastruc-
ture develop within uneven geographic economic 
systems. For the purposes of this paper, applying cu-
China’s Belt and Road rail freight transport corridors – the economic geography of underdevelopment
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Fig. 1 Kaldor stylised cumulative causation processes with historical institutional junctures and Eurasian rail policy variables. 
Source: adapted from O’Hara (2008), and expanded by the authors
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mulative causation theory to China’s policy interven-
tions in Eurasia allows an analysis of economic sys-
tems, physical networks, and policy instruments as 
institutions. We consider the policies of China’s cen-
tral government as institutions, that Belt and Road, CR 
Express, and Middle Corridor exist discretely within a 
spatially defined institutional environment. That the 
railway network itself is a physical geography insti-
tution, that cross-border intergovernmental mecha-
nisms and subnational policy instruments are politi-
cal institutions. As such we analyse China’s CR Express 
rail freight policy as an institution operating within 
the human geography of competing institutions with-
in the constraints of physical industrial geography. 
Employing cumulative causation theory for this study, 
we consider the China-Europe international railway 
as both a passive physical geography institution facil-
itating international trade between states and as an 
active human geography institution directly formed, 
maintained and guided by China government policy, 
local Central Asian political economy actors, and the 
economic geography factors of regional underdevel-
opment.
3. Development of China’s Eurasian transport 
policy
China has a series of spatial plans for taking its com-
mand economy institutions into the global economy 
(Kenderdine 2017). The two most important of these 
for the Belt and Road containerised freight policy are 
Maritime Power and Transport Power (PRC Ministry 
of Transport 2017). The Maritime Power policy came 
into public first from State Council’s 2003 “National 
Maritime Economic Development Program”. While 
Transport Power was only more recently codified into 
central policy in 2019 after initial transport policy, 
priority was shifted to international logistics in 2016 
(PRC Ministry of Transport 2016). This has allowed for 
both the Maritime Power and Transport Power policies 
to be developed and to maintain institutional integ-
rity independent of the central policy apparatus so 
that they may change, alter course or be abandoned 
while embedded within the constituent macro poli-
cies of Maritime Silk Road and New Silk Road Economic 
Belt and the hyperpolicy of Belt and Road. From the 
initial Maritime Power concept, China in 2019 flow-
ered a system of ‘power’ policies, including China as a 
Transport Power, Manufacturing Power, Internet Power, 
Biotechnology Power, and Basic Research Power. Mari-
time Power and Transport Power form ‘thread’ macro 
policies which weave into both Going Global and Inter-
national Capacity Cooperation, two macro policies of 
the Belt and Road (Bucsky and Kenderdine 2020a). This 
Matryoshka nesting of central level policies allows for 
temporal waxing and waning of policy strength given 
the longer time horizons of communist political pow-
er structures, for example 1999’s Going Global evolved 
in to 2015’s International Capacity Cooperation and 
then retreated back in to Going Global again in 2020 
(Kenderdine 2020).
In 2017, the Ministry of Commerce, the most impor-
tant foreign-policy institution for the Belt and Road 
project, released a policy statement calling for China 
to become a Transport Power (Zhang and Ye 2017). 
In 2018, Ministry of Transport Party Secretary Yang 
Chuantang and Deputy Party Secretary Li Xiaopeng co-
authored the policy prescription “Strive to Open a New 
Journey to Build a Strong Transport Country”, pub-
lished in the Party theory journal Qiushi and replicat-
ed at People’s Daily and Ministry of Transport (Yang 
and Li 2018). The transport policy plan was to move 
China from being an ‘important transport country’ 
( ) to a Transport Power ( ). The plan 
echoes other sectoral industrial policies in calling to 
transform from high-speed growth to high-quality 
growth as China attempts to orchestrate a state-driv-
en response to naturally decelerating industrial eco-
nomic growth rates, environmental protection meas-
ures and consumer quality controls. By September 
2019, the policy has been codified into a central party 
policy document titled “Outline for Construction of a 
National Transport Power” (Communist Party of China 
Central Committee 2019).
The National Transport Power Plan is an important 
document underpinning the continued development 
of the intercontinental rail freight system. From our 
close reading of the document we provide here some 
policy highlights. The plan provides that from 2021 
to 2050 Transport Power construction should be com-
pleted in two stages from 2021 to 2035 and from 2035 
to 2050 – this is conventional and in line with other 
central government policy directives to achieve Chi-
na’s Twin Centenary Goals. The plan is that by 2035 the 
basic domestic and internationally integrated trans-
port network should be completed and that China will 
have caught up to other big industrialised transport 
powers such as the United States, EU and Japan (CCP 
Central Committee 2019). The plan centres around a 
double 1-2-3 system – one for people and one for lo-
gistics. For people, 1-hour commute within metro-
China’s Belt and Road rail freight transport corridors – the economic geography of underdevelopment
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politan clusters, 2-hour commute within greater con-
urbations and 3-hour commutes to cities across the 
country; for logistics, 1-day domestic delivery, 2-day 
delivery in near-abroad countries and 3-day deliv-
ery to global economy cities. The plan also specifies 
that by 2025 both passenger and cargo intermodal 
national systems should be operational and that do-
mestic transport and special equipment manufacture 
should have improved to best safety quality, both are 
highly ambitious given China’s position in 2021. The 
less clear plan between 2035 and 2050 is for China to 
become a global leader in transport and logistics, to 
become internationally competitive in technological 
equipment and technological innovation and for the 
Transport Power development to dovetail with other 
‘power’ doctrines (CCP Central Committee 2019).
For intercontinental rail freight, the most important 
clause in the National Transport Power Plan is sec-
tion 8 titled “Opening Global-Oriented Cooperation, 
Mutual Benefit and Win-Win”. The three subclauses 
focus on developing interconnected and global trans-
port networks along the six economic corridors of the 
Silk Road Economic Belt, including physical network 
development of railways, waterways and pipelines 
(PRC National Development and Reform Commission 
2019a). The primary focus is on intercontinental rail-
way freight but the policy also targets aviation logis-
tics hubs and conventional maritime shipping. The 
plan also sees greater integration between transport 
infrastructure and industrial infrastructure outside 
China, with a specific target to integrate transport lo-
gistics with China’s growing network of overseas free 
trade zones and free trade ports. Subclause three in-
dicates intention to integrate global best practice by 
both bringing in international expertise into China’s 
transport system and also by allowing China to start 
setting global governance standards in transport.
Wider integration between the Transport Power doc-
trine and the intercontinental containerised rail 
freight system is also taking shape with central level 
policy guidance to supplement the initial ideological 
and ministerial-level policy developments. In 2016, 
the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) released a CR Express development policy to 
bring together the disparate Eurasian rail services of-
fered by local governments, rebrand them into a sin-
gle product, and help to coordinate the national inter-
continental rail system (Kenderdine 2018b). However, 
many of these intercontinental rail projects are une-
conomical, do not result in clear cumulative causation 
economic potential and are better analysed as state 
power geoeconomic policies rather than as conven-
tional economic development (Bucsky and Kenderdine 
2020a). 
China’s domestic logistics, rail freight development, 
industrial decapacity, and industrial transfer policies 
are all also interrelated and centrally coordinated. 
Most of China’s industrial economy was subject to 
the Supply-side Reform to restructure the economy 
away from industrial overcapacity, financial overlev-
eraging, and reliance on investment-driven real es-
tate (Naughton 2016). This policy-driven structural 
reform of China’s domestic economy occurred from 
2015 until 2020 when the dual circulation model 
was introduced (Blanchette and Polk 2020) and had 
reasonable success in industrial decapacity. How-
ever, against this trend, in rail freight development, 
transport in general and intercontinental rail freight 
in particular, China has been directly subsidising ex-
pansion of infrastructure, services and institutions, 
effectively creating a stimulus bubble within the rail 
transport sector, while much of the rest of the econ-
omy slowed and restructured under China’s tighter 
austerity-like policy measures. Expansion of the rail-
way equipment manufacturing sector in particular is 
an advanced manufacturing policy goal that supports 
both domestic industrial development as well as fa-
cilitates outward FDI into manufacturing hubs in Belt 
and Road economies (Pepermans 2019). This demon-
strates a synergy between national level industrial 
policies, with transport equipment manufacturing be-
ing a centrepiece of both Made in China 2025 as well 
as International Capacity Cooperation.
To guide this stimulus and policy development of 
the transport sector bubble, a series of central level 
regional spatial plans run alongside the 2019 Transport 
Power policy which coordinate the development 
of conventional rail, high-speed rail, air and water 
networks in a pattern of arterial and local cluster 
networks (cf. Fig. 2). The joint NDRC and Ministry 
of Transport 2018 “Layout and Construction Plan of 
National Logistics Hubs” intersects with transport and 
industrial policy and provides for the development of 
30 national logistics hubs by 2020, to serve as the base 
for 150 hubs by 2025 (PRC National Development and 
Reform Commission 2019b). The hub-channel-network 
system is designed to support both the Sky Silk Road 
and the New Eurasian Landbridge. China’s national 
logistics development is further guided by “Opinions 
of the National Development and Reform Commission 
China’s Belt and Road rail freight transport corridors – the economic geography of underdevelopment
98 DIE ERDE · Vol. 152 · 2/2021
and Others on Promoting Development of High-
quality Logistics and Promoting the Formation of a 
Strong Domestic Market” (PRC National Development 
and Reform Commission 2019b,c) which includes an 
addendum of ten main tasks for logistics development. 
A key component of the national logistics plan is to 
improve multimodal infrastructure and to integrate 
national spatial planning with the macroregional 
hubs of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, Yangtze 
River Delta, Pearl River Delta (redubbed ‘Greater 
Bay Area’) and the Jingjinji cluster of Beijing, Tianjin 
and Hebei. Lower-level subnational logistics spatial 
planning naturally intersects with both central 
policy and these macroregional hubs, such as the 
“Changsha Modern Logistics Industry Development 
Plan 2011-2020” and the “Implementation Plan of 
Henan Province’s Modern Logistics Operation System 
Layout and Construction” and Guizhou’s “Guiyang 
City’s Implementation Opinions on Promoting the 
Improvement and Development of the Logistics 
Industry” (Changsha Government Portal 2014; Henan 
Provincial Development and Reform Commission 
and Henan Provincial Department of Transportation 
2020; Guiyang Government Portal 2020). These 
lower political geographic implementation plans 
interpret and apply central-level policy to local 
structural conditions. Interrelated plans include the 
“National Mid- to Long Term Science and Technology 
Development Plan (2021-35)” which replaces the 
2006-2020 plan and which is relevant to transport 
equipment manufacturing, new materials and a range 
of other relevant technologies.
Subnational multimodal development integration 
with the National Logistics Hub Plan occurs through 
technically lower-tier but still massive spatial plan-
ning policies such as the “New Western Land-Sea Cor-
ridor Master Plan” (Western Corridor Plan) (Liu 2019). 
This Western Corridor Plan is a clear indication of how 
lower subnational industrial clusters are spatially 
China’s Belt and Road rail freight transport corridors – the economic geography of underdevelopment
West China Logistics Connectivity Master Plan
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Fig. 2 Chongqing logistics and multimodal transport integration under “New Western Land-Sea Corridor Master Plan” 
( ). Source: PRC National Development and Reform Commission (2019a)
99DIE ERDE · Vol. 152 · 2/2021
planned to link up and contribute to both domestic 
and intercontinental rail plans yet are themselves ex-
amples of multi-regional spatial planning (cf. Fig. 3). 
The Western Corridor Plan aims to strengthen the in-
ternational economic corridor between Singapore and 
Chongqing while integrating the domestic Southwest 
China industrial hub with Maritime Silk Road ports 
in Guangxi’s Beibu Gulf, and multimodal connections 
eastwards to the Yangtze River Economic Belt and 
westwards to the Silk Road Economic Belt via the CR 
Express system (PRC National Development and Reform 
Commission 2019a). Chongqing is the natural indus-
trial geography epicentre of the CR Express interconti-
nental rail system, and is also the major air freight hub 
for Southwestern China and the closest major China 
airport to Europe. China’s intermodal and cross-coun-
try industrial policy is to connect the upriver section 
of the Yangtze River Economic Belt with four coastal 
ports, the Beibu Gulf Deepwater Port, Guangxi Beibu 
Gulf International Gateway Port, Hainan Yangpu Port 
and Guangdong ’s Zhanjiang Port (PRC National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission 2019a). These ports 
face the Indian Ocean as part of the Maritime Silk Road 
and are designed to serve as an alternate connection 
to the Chongqing mega-city cluster, alongside the 
ocean connections to Shanghai downstream and the 
emerging Eurasian intercontinental rail system (PRC 
National Development and Reform Commission 2019a). 
Thus interlinkages between Chongqing become mari-
time south to Singapore, domestic multimodal trans-
port east via the Yangtze River Economic Belt to the 
Yangtze River Delta Economic Zone, and interconti-
nental rail northwest to both the Central Corridor to 
Russia and the Middle Corridor through Central Asia 
to Turkey (PRC National Development and Reform Com-
mission 2019). The Western Corridor Plan provides that 
by 2025 Chongqing logistics should be connected with 
Beibu Gulf Port in Guangxi and Yangpu Port in Hainan 
and that this rail-sea inter-model container transport 
corridor should reach a volume of 100,000 TEU (PRC 
National Development and Reform Commission 2019a).
The problem though is that for all China’s central 
guided spatial plans, traffic volumes between China 
and Europe via the Kazakhstan-Russia Central Corri-
dor are not showing the levels of growth needed for 
the system to become economically viable without 
China subsidies (Bucsky 2020). Policy development 
Fig. 3 Middle Corridor and CR Express Central Asia Class containerised rail freight infrastructure. Source: authors
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at the central level can result in a positive cumulative 
causation feedback loop, but it can also have no affect 
or have a deleterious effect. The Eurasia Rail Alliance 
(UTLC) of the railways of Kazakhstan, Russia and Be-
larus shows traffic growth of only 4% in 2019 with 
333,000 TEU transported, far off the 1 million TEU 
per year envisaged by China policymakers for 2020 
(Vinokurov et al. 2018). Meaning that the development 
of the system using China subsidies and then allow-
ing natural economies of scale to develop is not occur-
ring, or at least not occurring sufficiently quickly. In 
the following section we examine statistical evidence 
of Eurasian containerised rail freight throughput and 
consider the prospects of the TITR Middle Corridor 




The Iron Silk Road and the New Eurasian Landbridge 
policies both predate the Belt and Road macropolicy. 
These demonstrate the practice of policy-legitimation 
by the Centre in China, co-opting extant policies into 
a broader policy coalition (Bucsky and Kenderdine 
2020a). The New Asia-Europe Landbridge through the 
Alashankou border crossing was floated in China aca-
demic circles as early as 1997, with the infrastructure 
in place in the 1990s for a Lianyungang to Rotterdam 
corridor (Xu 1997). The Middle Corridor policy itself 
as a Central Asia to Lianyungang transport corridor 
is simply an appropriation of a policy designed by the 
Asian Development Bank and the Central Asia Re-
gional Economic Cooperation organisation which had 
a designated Caspian Sea to Lianyungang rail corridor 
as early as 2008 (Asian Development Bank 2008). We 
take this Middle Corridor transport route as a proxy 
institution for the entire Belt and Road freight, trade 
and industrial integration system, as it is the most in-
ternational and most developed of any intercontinen-
tal transport integration development program. We 
examine some problems with rail freight statistical 
data in the national economies of the Middle Corridor 
countries and compare the throughput data with in-
frastructural limitations on future growth. Despite 
investment-driven structural development from both 
sides of the Middle Corridor, we remain sceptical of any 
large-scale intercontinental rail freight system devel-
opment, with infrastructural bottlenecks in Turkey a 
particular concern.
External rail freight from Central Asia began in 1906 
with the Trans-Aral line, and later expanded by the 
Turkestan-Siberia line in 1929 which connected the 
Russian Turkestan region to both industrial Russia 
and to Europe, and with China via the Trans-Siberian 
line. While Russian rail infrastructure construction 
continued, the Sino-Soviet split meant that the Xinji-
ang railway was halted at Urumqi in 1962 and never 
connected to the Soviet Union. Even in the 21st cen-
tury, traffic flows and freight volumes between China, 
Europe and the Central Asian countries has remained 
low. The first connection was opened in 1992 after the 
extension of the North Xinjiang Railway connecting 
Urumqi to the Alashankou/Druzhba border crossing, 
with the second Jinghe-Yining-Khorgas line opera-
tional from 20121, this line is electrified to Ili, close 
to the Kazakhstan border. The new Khorgos dryport 
was developed as a hub for this line, but most freight 
traffic still crosses the more Europe-direct line at 
Alashankou. However, the major development in this 
21st century rail freight dynamic was not infrastruc-
tural but logistic, the introduction of container block 
trains with significantly lower transit times. The first 
trial container train between China and Europe was 
the Chongqing–Duisburg line in 2009, which became 
a regular service from the following year for Foxconn 
(Besharati et al.2017).
Container block trains and economic, trade and geo-
political effects have been analysed in detail (Blan-
chard and Flint 2017; Li et al. 2018; Vinokurov et al. 
2018). Data on traffic volumes though is scarce. While 
freight volumes have increased and are significant, 
deeper analysis of available data sources does not 
support the claims of rapid growth cited in China 
state media reports. The Coordination Committee for 
the development of the Trans-Caspian International 
Transport Route (TITR) publishes transport volume 
data on its website (Middle Corridor 2020), which we 
can compare with China-Europe rail volumes through 
the main Central Corridor through Kazakhstan, Rus-
sia and Belarus (Table 1). This shows that the Cen-
tral Corridor attracts higher traffic volumes by scale, 
however both the Russian Central Corridor and the 
Turkey Middle Corridor have seen rapid growth rates. 
Traffic volumes published by TITR are not easy to 
interpret though. The published aggregate data does 
not differentiate between intercontinental and in-
ternational freight carriage, meaning it is difficult to 
know whether the transport volumes measured are 
only China-Europe throughput volumes, or simply 
all international or even national transport along the 
China’s Belt and Road rail freight transport corridors – the economic geography of underdevelopment
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route. To better understand these transport volumes, 
other national and international data sources need to 
be utilised and analysed.
Of the countries with institutions participating in 
the Middle Corridor only Turkey is not a member of 
the Organization for Cooperation of Railways (OSJD). 
However, all other states with institutions in TITR are 
OSJD member states, so we can also observe traffic on 
Turkish border stations in the OSJD annual statistics 
data (OSJD 2018). This means that the OSJD annual 
statistics effectively cover the entire TITR transport 
and logistics zone. Data on all border stations though 
is not differentiated into containerised freight and 
bulk freight, giving only data for all aggregate traffic. 
Containers are only a small fraction of total traffic. To 
demonstrate this, we can compare bulk tonnage with 
TEUs but recalculating volumes in tons with a ratio 12 
tons/TEU net load (Bucsky 2018). It can be observed 
in Table 2 that total traffic volumes are much higher 
on the border stations between China and Kazakh-
stan than with other countries and that most of that 
traffic is destined for the Central Corridor to the EU, 
not to the Middle Corridor (cf. Fig. 4). From Georgia to 
Turkey there was no traffic registered in 2018 despite 
the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line.
Ferry connections on the Caspian Sea were already 
frequent before the development of the TITR trans-
port integration policy. There are two to three weekly 
sails between Baku and Aktau, and four to five weekly 
between Baku and Turkmenbashi. There is however 
no timetable. The routes take 30 and 17 hours respec-
tively, and the cost per TEU – without handling costs 
– is USD 500 and 600 (Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping 
Company 2021). No data is publicly available on traf-
fic volumes between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan from 
either state entities or the port operator companies. 

















Fig. 4 Traffic volume of containers (‘000 TEUs) on major 
China-Europe rail corridors. Source: Eurasian Rail 
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Table 2 Rail traffic volumes on 
border station along the 
Middle Corridor 2018. 
Source: OSJD (2019)
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However, from financial reports we can see no signs 
of traffic growth since either the Belt and Road or the 
Middle Corridor policy initiatives began. By contrast, 
state shipper Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company 
saw a decline in freight values from 180 million AZN 
(ca. USD 102 million) in 2017 to 171 million AZN (ca. 
USD 99 million) in 2018 according to its financial 
statement. If we estimate cargo volumes and divide by 
the approximate cost per TEU (USD 600), it shows 170 
to 165,000 TEU. However, the vast majority of cargo 
was bulk carriage, not containerised.
More data is available on Georgia. There were 36,000 
TEU containers transported by rail in 2016, 41,000 in 
2017 and 57,000 in 2018. For 2019, 75,000 TEUs were 
projected (Georgian Railways 2019). Georgia has both 
great capacity and actual volume of maritime container 
transport service, through the Poti and Batumi ports. 
Three quarters of Georgian trade is transacted with 
only six major partners: the EU (28%), Turkey (14%), 
Russia (11%), China (9%), Azerbaijan (7%) and Ukraine 
(5%). Of which over half of Georgia’s trade, that with 
the EU, China and Turkey, has the potential to shift at 
least some portion from maritime to rail transport.
Turkey would play a crucial role in any development 
of the overland Middle Corridor route, and the current 
TITR rail route faces major bottlenecks in the country. 
Container rail transport has grown rapidly in Turkey 
in the past decade, between 2011 and 2018 it saw 67% 
growth (Table 3). This growth rate however is almost 
identical to the 66% growth rate of containerised 
maritime transport volume. The reason for this is most 
probably that the growing number of containers han-
dled in ports resulted in a higher domestic hinterland 
transport by rail volume.
Containerised rail transport in Turkey measured in 
TEU is reported by Eurostat, however no details are 
available there for destination or origin. The Inter-
national Union for Road-Rail Combined Transport 
(UIRR) also publishes a country matrix of intermodal 
rail transport within Europe, we present the data for 
Turkey in Table 4. This is however not a comprehensive 
dataset, as it is data provided voluntarily by member 
corporations. Eurostat reported 17.3 million TEU for 
container transport in the EU in 2018, UIRR around 
half that at 8.6 million TEU (UIRR 2019). According 
to UIRR data, containerised transport in Turkey was 
only 7.3% of all rail intermodal transport (Table 3). 
From this we could then assume that EU-Turkey con-
tainerised transport by rail could make up to around 
15% of the total intermodal transport volume. Again 
though, the potential for greater intermodal contain-
erised rail transport is bottleneck-limited as essen-
tially all rail freight passes through a single railway 
line to Istanbul.
Rail transport in Turkey generally is very domestic-
oriented: cross border traffic in 2018 was only 7.2% 
of total measured by tons, and 4.5% measured by ton-
kilometres (Table 3). This underpins the fact that EU-
Turkey transport is concentrated on a relatively short 
section of the Turkish rail network. The Middle Corri-
dor should serve not only international transport but 
intercontinental transport. But in the case of Turkey, 
the required transit transport is almost non-existent. 
The 2018 transit volume was just 21,000 tons, mean-
ing 21 container trains with 82 TEU loaded at an aver-
age of twelve tons per TEU. Eurostat data shows that 
there was zero containerised transit transport in Tur-
key between 2016 and 2018. This all means that ‘in-
ternational’ rail freight data, while already low, could 
China’s Belt and Road rail freight transport corridors – the economic geography of underdevelopment
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completely obfuscate the almost negligible amount of 
transit transport across Turkey which would be need-
ed for a viable intercontinental rail freight system.
The Eurostat database has information on Turkey’s 
international rail transport measured by unloading 
(Turkish export) and loading (Turkish import) coun-
try only for 2018. The data shows that Turkey’s rail 
exports are heavily concentrated on Europe: 80% 
of all cargo was sent to and received from EU coun-
tries, of which two thirds was with Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Austria2. In comparison, Iran’s non-EU interna-
tional rail transport is considerable at 16% of total 
traffic. All other countries had a share of just 4% or 
less. There was no rail transport between China and 
Azerbaijan in 2018, as except from Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan no shipment was sent to the Central 
Asian countries. Total international rail transport 
volume was the equivalent of 2,074 container trains 
or 173 thousand TEU – but it has to emphasised, that 
this a theoretical calculation: only an almost certain-
ly smaller part of total transport was containerised. 
The data suggests that from the Turkey rail network’s 
planned development of rail transport to and from 
Europe, that Europe remains far more attractive than 
any eastward trade with Asia for Turkey.
Official statistics do not show any rail traffic growth 
impact due to the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars line 
in October 2017. However, Turkish media has report-
ed that in the first two years the line attracted 275 
thousand tons of rail freight transport, so an average 
of 137.5 thousand tons per year (Daily Sabah 2019). 
This also means that transport on this route is still 
lower than on the single line to Iran, the capacity of 
which is severely limited by the Van Lake ferry3. The 
mid-term goal of 3 million tons per year, and the long-
term goal 6.5 million tons per year seems optimistic 
considering the non-electrified single-track align-
ment and the bottlenecks of the connecting infra-
structure. The double-tracked electrified connection 
from Istanbul to Europe with much better connecting 
infrastructure had an operational capacity of 0.6 mil-
lion tons from Turkey to the EU in 2018, meaning two-
way trade of 1.2 million tons. For Turkey’s eastward 
trade flow to be four times that of the EU given the 
infrastructure bottlenecks is almost unreal.
We can also analyse current trade flows by mode of 
transport from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey with 
China and Central Asian and other Middle Corridor 
countries based on the United Nations Internation-
al Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade database). 
However, data is not available on China itself. In this 
sense there is a higher potential to divert freight 
traffic from maritime to rail in the case of all three 
countries analysed, as rail currently plays an almost 
negligible role in all three cases. Trade amongst 
Azerbaijan-Georgia and Turkey is also currently 
mostly by road, which has a clear potential for at least 
partial diversion to rail with competitive transport 
costs and delivery schedules (Table 5). In particular, 
the Turkey-China trade volumes are high enough to 
expect sufficient growth in rail freight traffic volumes, 
but between Azerbaijan and Georgia to and from both 
Turkey and China, the trade volumes are very modest. 
Unfortunately, Comtrade data does not include 
volumes, only values, therefore this can only be used 
as an indication and no estimates for the number of 
containers or traffic volumes can be compiled.
From examining the current and historical contain-
erised rail freight volumes along the Middle Corridor 
economies, we see a series of infrastructural and in-
stitutional blockages to future development. Howev-
er, even this negative analysis is based on incomplete 
data. We recommend the development of more holistic 
databasing and statistical collection of Central Asian, 
Middle Corridor, Eurasian and Eastern European rail 
freight systems in order to better understand changes 
in both structure and flow of the developing intercon-
tinental rail trade. China´s maritime trade, export and 
import markets, and connectivity potential are highly 
attractive to the Central Asia, Caucasus, Turkey and 
Eastern European economies. The economic geogra-
phy across the Middle Corridor rail zone does hold po-
China’s Belt and Road rail freight transport corridors – the economic geography of underdevelopment
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Table 4 Container transport in Turkey by mode of transport in thousand TEU. Source: UIRR (2019)
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tential for the agglomeration and economies of scale 
efficiencies for cumulative causation accumulation 
to occur. A China-led and China-funded subsidisation 
of rail would be needed for long-term development of 
the Middle Corridor, and the major obstacle remains 
the serious infrastructure bottlenecks in Turkey. 
However, on examination of the current data, the de-
velopment of large-scale rail freight between Western 
China and Turkey seems unrealistic given current 
economic conditions.
5. China’s regional policy transmission coun-
terfactual
Despite rail freight data limitations, reading the policy 
intentions of states’ future development plans is 
possible from policy documents even with the absence 
of data. And there is much space for understanding 
the China-Eurasia intercontinental rail, industrial and 
financial system development from theoretical and 
methodological perspectives. However, much extant 
analysis of the Iron Silk Road avoids data, policy and 
theory, instead relying on tired geopolitical tropes, 
open speculation and lived-experience travelogues. 
The proliferation of subjunctive analyses masks 
the real counterfactual of lack of institutionalised 
policy transmission from China to host economies. 
Transport industry website reports, China and 
Central Asia state media, private media, and academic 
research are all struggling to analyse the development 
of the CR Express intercontinental rail system. This is 
because the systems, industries and policies involved 
are deliberately opaque, and the policy transmission 























































































































































































































































Table 5 International railway goods transport from Turkey to the unloading country. Source: authors’ calculation from United 
Nations International Trade Statistics Database (2020)
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mechanisms between China and host economies are 
closed, and in some cases classified state secrets. 
Many media outlets have remained dubious of the 
Iron Silk Road rail freight system and its chances for 
economic transformative effects (Ruehl 2019; Sim and 
Aminjonov 2020). While there have been credible and 
well-argued positive media analysis of CR Express 
policy and its implications for Europe (van Leijen 
2020), most analysts have taken a cautious narrative 
and consistently argued against the hype (Ruehl 2019; 
Shepard 2020). 
Academic research from China institutions on 
CR Express is focusing on network development, 
node selection and development and cross-border 
institutional integration. China researchers on CR 
Express and domestic transport policy integration 
have focused on developing and consolidating logistics 
node networks (Zhang et al.2020; Murayev 2020), 
international and domestic rail transport integration 
( Jiang et al. 2018) or optimising spatial layout (Zhao 
et al. 2020) or institutional integration (Wei and Lee 
2021). However, there is little work done on rail system 
integration from either the local Eurasian policy 
research community or the European multilateral 
system. This leaves researchers and analysts prone to 
reactive policy-discourse taking, the Eurasian states 
to a reactive policy-dependency while the China-
side develops more sophisticated theory and policy 
to improve rail connectivity. The location of some 
proposed rail lines, to Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan 
and even remote possibilities of connecting the 
network to Afghanistan and Tajikistan demonstrate 
that for the China-state, this network development is 
strategic, not economic.
However, from the perspective of local Eurasian 
economies traversed by CR Express, there is neither 
an economic nor a political rationale, and generation 
of research and policy analysis within the region 
is hampered by lack of policy data. China’s central 
policy planning model can leave local Central Asian, 
Eurasian and Caucasus economies dependent on 
their political relationship with Beijing and with the 
vagaries of policy and regulatory application from 
China (Kenderdine 2018c). This was evidenced in late 
2020 with rail freight backups on the Kazakhstan 
border at Alashankou and Khorgos (Kenderdine and 
Bucsky 2021b). Not only the use of existing rail freight 
networks by CR Express but also the construction of 
new lines spivved by Beijing policy loosely coopts 
local elites into the projects with virtually no public 
oversight, particularly on the peripheral connections 
such as in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
(Pannier 2020; Bucsky and Kenderdine 2020b). This 
broader policy-dependency applies equally to other 
network industries, such as pipelines and electricity 
meaning research and analysis of China’s investment 
and use of fixed capital in the region is avoiding extant 
policy and institutional evidence. While macroregional 
overview approaches are useful (Mardell 2020), there 
is little research on China in Central Asia from a source-
based policy analysis perspective, exceptions such as 
Yau (2020) demonstrate a lack of wider engagement 
with policy and operational realities of the Belt and 
Road, industrial investment in Central Asia or China 
network industries’ development and use.
This lack of Eurasian regional research on CR Express 
not only means there is a significant knowledge 
gap but also makes future studies difficult because 
there will be so few secondary sources built from 
primary qualitative or quantitative data which could 
have formed the foundation for future study. Many 
academics are caught in the middle without enough 
data to make informed analysis (Tjia 2020). This leaves 
policy-makers in both China, Belt and Road economies 
and third-party economies with incomplete research 
and analysis tools. In the Middle Corridor case study, we 
argue that the host economy governments themselves 
are often flying blind with little indication of the 
institutional arrangements that would be necessary 
to integrate local rail freight systems with China. 
There is clear political will and economic incentive for 
the Middle Corridor economies to unify their internal 
markets and to connect with China in the East and 
Europe in the West (Kenderdine and Bucsky 2021a). 
Yet poor policy transmission from China hinders 
this development. China’s advanced spatial planning 
models and policy transmission domestically occurs 
within a clear public administration hierarchy. While 
China’s national level policy making apparatus often 
takes the credit for policy successes, much practical 
policy is tested at the Provincial and Prefectural 
levels of government. It is these political economic 
institutions which are not connecting to their peers in 
the Eurasian state governments, and lack of analysis 
here leads to either light reports based on conjecture 
(Sukhrob 2020), or the Tang-dynasty mythmaking 
and neo-Tianxia foreign policy (Hückel 2012) of China 
State media triumphalism.
This matters not only for China, Central Asia and 
Eurasia but for the EU too. The institutional practices 
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of China in the Eurasian region and the policies 
adopted in Europe towards Eurasian rail integration 
will directly impact the economic lives of European 
citizens through projects such as the Budapest-
Belgrade rail upgrade or increasing sales of rolling 
stock. The CR Express Eurasian rail policy as a trade 
facilitation, regional economic development, and 
macroregional economic integration policy is not 
radical. The problem is that so many elements of 
CR Express remain opaque, undisclosed or overtly 
classified. China running an intercontinental rail 
freight system in secrecy cannot result in optimal 
trading arrangements with the EU or with the 
Middle Corridor economies. A freight policy need not 
be secret and yet it appears that China is waiting to 
develop a new form of regional multilateralism before 
developing the institutions of rail freight logistics 
development. There are serious dangers in building 
bilateral and multilateral political and geoeconomic 
analysis and policy proposals after the economic 
development has already occurred. If the CR Express 
intercontinental rail system was truly booming and 
its transformative structural effects were resulting in 
spill-over industrial cluster node development along 
the rail line geography, then China could be leading 
economic development in Central Asia, and the China 
rail model could become an attractive development 
economics template (Guo and Fidan 2018). This is not 
happening.
This economic development spill-over hypothesis 
remains difficult to test without data. And where 
China Party-State discourses surrounding Belt and 
Road and CR Express can be controlled and tailored for 
both domestic policy consumption and pushed into 
Eurasian host economies, there can be no obfuscation 
of data when trading with the EU. For the CR Express 
intercontinental rail system to be successfully 
deployed, there must be two-way transparency in 
both freight usage and policy dissemination. Without 
EU involvement, a China-Central Asia rail freight 
network is plausible, but would be both politically 
and economically dependent on Beijing. This lack 
of policy transparency in CR Express development 
makes it difficult to avoid a dichotomy of narratives, 
as the dialectic of external institutional analysis 
pushes towards either a pro Party-State development 
economics propaganda narrative or anti-China 
geoeconomic threat narrative. We see more a ‘China 
blunder’ narrative where internal aspects of Party-
State policy deployment hinder geoeconomic policy 
intentions. The formation of the narrative from 
Beijing itself creates this institutional impasse 
and leaves most subnational China and national 
Central Asian governments, as well as an array 
of financial institutions, logistics enterprises or 
research institutions without sufficient quantitative 
or qualitative data to make either informed political 
or economic decisions or research findings. This 
counterfactual of China’s policy transmission, 
dissemination and deployment is ultimately the 
weakest institutional force in any potentially 
economically transformative effects which CR Express 
possesses.
6. Conclusion: Iron Silk Road fails to deliver on 
potential
State intervention in national economies, spatial 
planning, or strategic state geoeconomic policy, is not 
limited to the Communist planned-economy experi-
ment. From industrialising Germany to the modern 
European Commission to the Japan or Korea indus-
trialisation experience, there are many examples of 
successful state intervention in economic activity, 
resulting in endogenous growth. This is particularly 
true of investment in network industries such as rail-
ways, electricity and telecommunications which have 
clear cumulative causative spill-over effects on other 
aspects of economic activity. Cumulative causation is 
the fundamental economic development theory which 
should explain any success of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative, Silk Road Economic Belt, or the CR Express 
intercontinental rail policy. However, in practice, 
China’s attempt at a holistic command economy ap-
proach to economic integration in Eurasia is failing to 
develop regions of endogenous accumulation. For Belt 
and Road, Middle Corridor or CR Express to succeed, 
the initial public policy economic intervention must 
result in local economies of endogenous growth tak-
ing hold. While the system relies on material transfers 
from Beijing, the intercontinental rail freight network 
cannot be considered an economic good, but only a 
policy-driven geoeconomic ideal.
We have demonstrated a primary-sourced historical 
institutional record of China’s domestic and interna-
tional transport policy which shows the development 
and future trajectory of China’s Eurasian transport 
policy based on institutional path-dependencies. We 
analysed core national and subnational China policy 
documents to construct a narrative of China’s whole-
of-government public administration response to 
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developing the intercontinental transport, trade and 
industrial system. And we have offered a heterodox 
theoretical economic explanation for how China’s pol-
icy intervention in the transport networks of Eurasia 
could succeed. But our case study on the Middle Corri-
dor demonstrates the lack of data availability, the dif-
ficulty in producing data, and the known infrastruc-
tural bottlenecks within the intercontinental rail 
system. Coupled with the counterfactual unknown of 
central China policy calculus, we demonstrate empiri-
cal evidence that China’s intercontinental rail project 
is not on sound economic policy footing.
CR Express policy sources demonstrate that China can 
neither project its institutional competence to cover 
its external economic operations nor inspire insti-
tutional development in host economies to integrate 
with China’s domestic political economy model. Cou-
pled with the lack of freight data, this leaves serious 
questions as to the institutional form that any Eura-
sian regional multilateral trade, transport or logistics 
system would take. We express doubt as to the under-
lying factors behind the intercontinental rail system 
being developed by China and its surrounding Eura-
sian policy and we have argued for an institutional-
ist approach to future analysis of trade, transport, 
governance, and political development in Eurasia sur-
rounding containerised rail freight development. On 
what evidence we could derive on carriage volumes 
and capacity of the Middle Corridor case study, we find 
the evidence unconvincing that a cumulative causa-
tion event could occur in Eurasia as a result of the CR 
Express rail system development. 
We contend that the multilateral institutional vacuum 
created by applying China’s domestic planned economy 
approach in external host economies is a critical im-
pediment to the successful deployment of the CR Ex-
press containerised rail freight policy in Eurasia. With-
out adequate institutional representation at the trade 
and industry levels, China’s domestic industrial insti-
tutions are ill-prepared for economic governance of 
Belt and Road institutional trade architecture. Neither 
is there sufficient political will nor economic capacity 
of the Central Asia, Caucasus, Turkey or East European 
economies to create the Belt and Road trade bloc under 
which to adequately interoperate with Beijing’s trans-
port and industrial docking framework. The result of 
this is institutional bottlenecks, where policy trans-
mission from Beijing is theoretically and institutionally 
possible in China, but not institutionally viable across 
the spectrum of the Eurasian Belt and Road economies.
The CR Express intercontinental rail freight institution 
that was policy-prescripted to vanguard China’s 
Eurasian trade and industry agenda is not rapidly 
moving to accumulation and agglomeration not due 
to theoretical economic failings, but to practical 
political shortcomings. The greatest weakness of the 
CR Express rail system across Eurasia in general and 
the Middle Corridor in particular is China running 
bilateral geoeconomic policies as if they were domestic 
economic bureaucracies. CR Express, Middle Corridor, 
and Belt and Road are all institutional manifestations 
of China’s economic policy planning process being 
applied to economies external to China. The command 
economy model proved an inefficient yet sufficiently 
effective tool for China’s own economic development. 
Applying this policy planning model to external 
economies though is a risk that should only be borne 
by China itself, and not foisted onto the peoples of the 
developing economies of Eurasia.
Notes
1 Khorgas is the international romanisation for the China 
side of the border established by the 1881 Treaty of St. 
Petersburg, which is Huo’erguosi County (霍爾果斯) in 
contemporary China. Khorgos is the romanisation of the 
Russian Хоргос (Kazakh is cyrillicised as Қорғас).
2 Export volume matches TCDD reported volumes in its an-
nual report.
3 Both directions (to and from Turkey) can be estimated at 
around 0.5 million tons.
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